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IRAQ: ONE YEAR LATER
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL°
Almost exactly one year ago, during her presidential speech at the 2003 Annual Meeting of
the American Society of International Law, Anne-Marie Slaughter spoke of the use of force that
began in Iraq shortly before that Annual Meeting. She concluded that the war was unlawful but
nevertheless potentially legitimate. That conclusion provoked a great debate from the moment
her speech ended. Our purpose today is to take up that debate.
Dean Slaughter will have a chance to return to her remarks today and assess for us whether
she has concluded that the use of force in Iraq was legitimate and if not what could have made
it so. She will also remark on the idea that some uses of force should be considered legitimate
even if they violate international law.
She will be followed by Richard Falk, who helped conceive the notion that major uses of
force, while unlawful, could still be considered legitimate. Professor Falk made this con-
tribution in the independent Kosovo Commission's Report in 2000. He told Dean Slaughter
last year before her presidential speech that the use of force in Iraq was both unlawful and
illegitimate. He still defends assessing uses of force as sometimes legitimate even if unlawful
but will clarify for us today why Iraq is not such a case and why he knew one year ago that it
was not.
Next is Thomas Franck, who has serious concerns about the whole idea of introducing
considerations of legitimacy in the face of illegality. In his most recent book on our subject,
Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attack (2002), he shifts focus
from the substantive rules prohibiting force, which he wants to preserve, to the consequences
of violating the rule. While we cannot adjust the rules during or after a violation, Professor
Franck says we can adjust the consequences, depending on the circumstances of the wrong. For
him, Kosovo was a case for mitigating consequences; Iraq is not. In his remarks today he
focuses on the hubris that led the United States to war in Iraq, a war wholly lacking immediate
necessity.
Mary Ellen O'Connell follows next. She will look at whether Professor Franck's mitigation
doctrine is likely to accomplish for international law what he hopes: preservation of robust sub-
stantive rules but with greater flexibility than the system currently allows. Professor O'Connell
argues that what international law needs now is less flexibility, not more. Both Secretary Powell
and Secretary Rumsfeld have said that no Security Council resolution was needed for Kosovo
and one was not needed for Iraq. Mr. Blair and Mr. Bush speak of humanitarian considera-
tions for the Iraq invasion, drawing comparisons to Kosovo. The flexibility introduced into the
law since Kosovo has rendered it far more difficult to convince leaders that international law
is real law.
Following Professor O'Connell is James Crawford. Professor Crawford will consider how
politicians are using international law and possibly this very debate over legitimacy and
legality for their own purposes. He, too, takes up the concept of "unlawful but legitimate," and
even more the concept of "unlawful but potentially legitimate," to expose how distant such
ideas are from the international community's agreed law, and how potentially destructive to it
they are.
* William B. Saxbe Designated Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University.
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THE USE OF FORCE IN IRAQ: ILLEGAL AND ILLEGITIMATE
by Anne-Marie Slaughter*
A year ago, when the United States and Britain decided to send troops to Iraq without a
second UN resolution, I argued that their action was illegal under international law butpoten-
tially legitimate in the eyes of the international community. I set forth three criteria for deter-
mining the ultimate legitimacy of the action:
1) Whether the coalition forces did in fact find weapons of mass destruction;
2) Whether coalition forces were welcomed by the Iraqi people; and
3) Whether the United States and Britain turned back to the United Nations as quickly
as possible after the fighting was done.
A year later, I conclude that the invasion was both illegal and illegitimate. The coalition's deci-
sion to use force without a second Security Council resolution cannot stand as a precedent for
future action; rather, it was a mistake that should lead us back to genuine multilateralism.
None ofthe criteria I put forward has been fully met. Above all, no weapons of mass destruc-
tion have been found. The best President Bush could do in his State of the Union address was
to claim that U.S. inspectors had found "dozens of weapons of mass destruction-related pro-
gram activities." As dangerous as Saddam Hussein may have been to the world, he did not pose
the kind of imminent threat necessary to justify preemptive action.
Second, the vast majority of Iraqis are indeed glad to be rid of Saddam Hussein, but an equal
number appear to perceive the coalition presence more as an occupation than a liberation.
Third, the U.S. administration is only really "going back to the UN" now, when it has been
forced to recognize that it cannot broker a political settlement without UN assistance, and when
it is likely looking for someone else to blame if Iraq descends into chaos in the months leading
up to the presidential election.
Why distinguish between legality and legitimacy in the first place? After the NATO inter-
vention in Kosovo, a distinguished international commission found that it was illegal but
legitimate. It is sometimes necessary to break international law to change it; where the law does
not permit what the international community approves, the commission argued, the law must
be updated "to close the gap between legality and legitimacy."1 It thus concluded that UN rules
and international law generally needed to be updated to permit armed intervention for purposes
of humanitarian protection under carefully specified conditions.
The lesson of the invasion of Iraq is quite different. The nations that insisted on more evi-
dence that Iraq actually possessed weapons of mass destruction, more time for the inspectors
to do their work, more time for a fully mobilized international community to exert diplomatic
pressure, proved to be right. I believe that the Iraqi people are unquestionably better off without
Saddam Hussein, and that the prospects for creating a stable and more democratic Iraqi govern-
ment are still alive, although they are going to require coordinated international effort and
assistance for many years. But the ends cannot justify the means with regard to war, any more
than we can authorize police to detain and search ordinary citizens on a false warrant as long
as they ultimately find some evidence of criminal activity. The United States offered the world
a false warrant.
* Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University; and former ASIL
President. This article was also published in the ASIL Newsletter, Mar./Apr. 2004, at 1.
' Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report 10 (Oxford University Press 2000).
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UN rules should be updated to make it easier, in Kofi Annan's words to the General As-
sembly this past September,2 to consider "early authorization of coercive measures," which is
UN-speak for collective preemption. The world faces very different threats than it did in 1945;
international law must adapt. In particular, nations must be prepared to recognize the combined
threat of a government that has access to weapons of mass destruction and no internal checks
on its power, as evidenced by massive human rights abuses, complete control of the media, and
an absence of any political opposition. The UN Security Council must be prepared to enforce
its resolutions consistently and unanimously.
But the most important lesson of the invasion of Iraq is that the safeguards built into the
requirement of the multilateral authorization of the use of force by UN members are both jus-
tified and necessary. If nations seeking to use force cannot mount strong enough evidence of
a security threat to convince a majority of the Security Council and to avoid a veto (provided
that the veto is not clearly motivated by countervailing political interests), the world should
wait and try another way before sending in the troops.
THE IRAQ WAR AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
by Richard Falk*
A year after the initiation of the Iraq War is not too soon to assess, if tentatively, the impact
of this globally controversial war upon international law. My assessment is organized around
five questions that deserve responses at this point:
1) Should the Iraq War be treated as a defining moment for international law?
2) Should refusal to endorse the Iraq War be regarded as a triumphant moment for the
United Nations, especially the Security Council?
3) Can the Iraq War be interpreted as an illegal but legitimate war of choice?
4) Should the legal norm of nonintervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states be
abandoned?
5) Does the Iraq War provide an occasion for incorporating new norms of international
law governing the use of force?
My response to each of these questions is a resounding "No." The remainder of this brief
presentation will give the essential reasoning behind the answer.
1) Should the Iraq War be treated as a defining moment for international law? No.
There is some temptation to contend that the Iraq War was a defining moment for inter-
national law and for the authority of the United Nations. It could be argued, of course, that the
Iraq War vindicates nondefensive wars of choice, and that UN opposition has made, as Presi-
dent Bush warned in his speech to the General Assembly of September 12, 2002, the organi-
zation "irrelevant." Such a temptation is easily resisted.
Recourse to war against Iraq in March 2003 on the facts and allegations that existed at the
time is regarded around the world as so flagrantly at odds with international law and the UN
Charter as generally understood to have little or no weight as a legal precedent. It is better
understood as a prominent instance of a violation of the core obligation of the UN Charter, as
2 Kofi Amnnan, Address by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, UN Doc. SG/SM/8891, Sept. 23, 2003, available at
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sgsn889I .doc.htm>.
" Albert G. Milbank Professor Emeritus of International Law, Princeton University; and Visiting Distinguished
Professor in Global and International Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara.
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embodied in Article 2(4); as such it qualifies as a potential Crime Against Peace in the Nurem-
berg sense. It provides an occasion to reaffirm the fundamentally sound idea embodied in inter-
national law that force can only legally be used under conditions ofpalpable defensive necessity
(or possibly on the basis of an explicit mandate from the Security Council).
Note that defensive necessity is broader than "self-defense"; it does take realistic account of
the post-9/ 11 world that could validate preemptive uses of force under exceptional conditions
of demonstrated threat. The Afghanistan War might qualify under such legal reasoning as a
valid claim of defensive necessity. Several of the staunchest supporters of the Iraq War as a
matter of strategic and moral necessity, such as the British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the
influential American neoconservative Richard Perle, have stated that respect for international
law was not warranted to the extent that it would have precluded the Iraq War. In effect, the
most articulate advocates of the Iraq War concede, implicitly or explicitly, either its "illegality"
or that if "regime change" of this sort was precluded, then it was "bad law."
It is notable that the Bush administration made only the most minimal effort to provide a
legal rationale for the Iraq War. Its public justifications were based on a confusing mixture of
security and humanitarian rationales. As for the irrelevance of the UN, the difficulties of the
occupation have increasingly led even the Bush administration to seek UN help in bringing
stability to Iraq.
Shifting ground, I would argue that if the Iraq War had turned out to be successful as a polit-
ical project, it might well have been a defining moment for American foreign policy and the
character of world order. It could have become a precedent for American unilateralism within
the context of recourse to war and for regime-changing interventions. If this pattern were estab-
lished, it would have produced what might be called a geopolitical norm, that is, a use of power
in a predictable pattern to achieve specified goals. The main feature of such a norm would be a
repudiation of the authority of international law and the UN Charter by state practice that
violates a consensus that joins the views of the majority of states and world public opinion.
At present, the U.S. government seems to be claiming the role of the legislative agency for
creation of geopolitical norms, reinforced by ad hoc coalitions of the willing, in at least two
areas impinging on the legal norms governing the use of force: (1) intervention in sovereign
states to achieve regime change; and (2) selective coercive pressure to promote counter-pro-
liferation goals beyond the mandate of the nonproliferation treaty regime. To the extent that
these geopolitical norms are acted upon, it represents a fundamental shift from world order
based on the principles ofterritorial sovereignty to world order based on hegemonic edict. Such
a world is best denominated an imperial world order and would likely be challenged by statist
and nonstatist forms of armed resistance.
2) Should the refusal to endorse the Iraq War by the United Nations, especially the Security
Council, be viewed as a triumphant moment? No.
Many opponents of the Iraq War have praised the UN Security Council for remaining stead-
fast in the face of formidable U.S. pressure for a formal mandate for initiation of a regime-
changing war against Iraq. I agree that the Security Council deserves some credit for this result,
but I would argue that it did only about 25 percent of the job entrusted to it by the UN Charter.
If the American-led claims against Iraq were evaluated from the perspective of international
law or by reference to the war prevention goals of the Charter, the UN performance was still
75 percent or so deficient.
There are several dimensions of this deficiency:
1) The UN imposed on Iraq a punitive peace via SC Resolution 687 (April 3, 1991)
comparable in the setting of the Gulf War to the discredited Versailles approach to
Germany after World War I.
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2) The UN lent its authority to more than twelve years of punitive sanctions against Iraq
(1991-2001) despite evidence of indiscriminate, severe harm to the Iraqi civilian pop-
ulation.
3) The UN did not censure the United States or the United Kingdom for repeated threats
and uses of force that intruded upon the sovereign rights of Iraq in this same period.
4) SC Res. 1441 (Nov. 8, 2002) adopted the main premises of the American geopolitical
norms relating to counter-proliferation and regime change, seemingly suggesting that
if Washington had been more patient the endorsement of recourse to war would likely
have been forthcoming.
In the background of the UN role with respect to the Iraq War are some important issues,
though they are admittedly hypothetical. Suppose that the Security Council had authorized the
Iraq War. Would that make it "legal"? Is the UN legally entitled to endorse what would be
otherwise considered to be a war of aggression without such an endorsement? Who is auth-
orized to make such a determination if there is no judicial review of Security Council decisions,
as seems to be the implication of the World Court judgment in Lockerbie? It seems reasonable
that only the General Assembly has residual responsibility to assess whether the Security Coun-
cil has acted beyond the constitutional limits imposed by the UN Charter, but it lacks the power
of decision, and its judgment would be only an expression of opinion.
3) Can the Iraq War be interpreted as an illegal but legitimate war of choice? No.
In my view, the illegality of recourse to war against Iraq in 2003 was clear. It was also clear
before and after the war that there was no reasonable basis for invoking the "illegal but legiti-
mate" formula used by the Independent International Commission for Kosovo to deal with an
exceptional circumstance of humanitarian emergency. With respect to Iraq, the worst humani-
tarian abuses were associated with the campaign against the Kurds in the late 1980s and against
the Kurds and Shi'ia in southern Iraq immediately after the Gulf War in 1991. Perhaps a case
for humanitarian intervention could have been credibly made in these earlier settings, but the
Kosovo exception was based on the imminence of the danger associated with the feared ethnic
cleansing of the Albanian population, made credible by Serb behavior in Bosnia just a few
years earlier and by the rising tide of atrocities in Kosovo in the months preceding recourse to
war, under the NATO umbrella but without a Security Council mandate.
Given the failure to find weapons of mass destruction of any variety in Iraq and considering
the intense resistance to the occupation, there is also no way to maintain convincingly that a
condition of either defensive necessity or humanitarian emergency existed in Iraq as of 2003.
If there was such an emergency it was not attributable to the Baghdad regime, however dic-
tatorial its record, but was a result of UN sanctions and numerous uses of force against Iraq.
4) Should the legal norm of nonintervention in internal affairs of sovereign states be aban-
doned? No.
The Iraq War, along with other experience with interventionary diplomacy, suggests that
respect for the norm of nonintervention, accompanied by respect for territorial sovereignty,
continues to represent a prudent guideline for statecraft. If the U.S. government had adhered
to such a guideline over the course of the last several decades it would have avoided its two
worst foreign policy disasters: The Vietnam War and the Iraq War. If it had refrained from
regime-changing covert interventions in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954), it might have
avoided the Iranian Revolution and the years of atrocity and brutality in Guatemala.
The Iraq War confirms the wisdom of avoiding interventionary diplomacy unless there is a
genuine defensive necessity or humanitarian emergency, and even then caution is appropriate.
As the Iraqi resistance confirms, interventionary wars are primarily political phenomena, not
266 ASIL Proceedings, 2004
military; they are decided by the play of nationalist, ethnic, and religious passions. It is best to
await the dynamics of self-determination to achieve transformative changes in dictatorial states.
The experience with Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and South Africa is both instructive and
encouraging.
5) Does the Iraq War suggest the need for adapting international law to the new conditions
of international conflict in the aftermath of 9/11? No.
From the argument so far, the simple conclusion is that the Iraq War is an occasion for
reaffirming the continuing viability and validity of the legal prohibition against nondefensive
uses of force that is contained in the Charter. At the same time, the grave threats posed by the
sort of mega-terrorist attacks of 9/11 do justify stretching the right of self-defense to validate
uses of force, as necessary, to remove threats associated with nonstate actors when the ter-
ritorial government is unable or unwilling to address the situation decisively and with due
urgency. The Afghanistan War, with qualifications, arguably fits within such an expanded
conception of self-defense.
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UN AFTER IRAQ
by Thomas M Franck*
THE GREAT DELUSION
"Voila le soleil d'Austerlitz!" Napoleon boasted, recalling his triumph seven years earlier
over the Austrians, as his officers formed outside the gates of Moscow in 1812. This bit of
over-the-top braggadocio symbolizes a larger truth: Emperors and empires, sooner or later, get
things wrong. History is littered with the shards of their grandeur:
Two vast and trunkless legs of stone
Stand in the desert....
My name is Ozymandias, king of kings:
Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair....
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare
The lone and level sands stretch far away.
In a sense, the imperial penchant for failure is a pity, for otherwise humanity might by now
have emancipated itself from its narrow tribalism to achieve a form of the global unity so
enthusiastically espoused by Alexander the Great, Claudius I, and Napoleon, not to mention
prominent contemporary publicists of international law. But bad things always happen, even
to relatively benign imperialists as well as (fortunately) to the really awful ones like Adolf
Hitler. Invariably, at some point they or their minions make a fatal mistake.
This easily accessible lesson of history is worth another look as the United States, hot on the
heels of Macedonia, Rome, et al., enters into what Andy Warhol might have characterized as
its fifteen minutes of fame as the world's single superpower. The American president has
already made clear that he intends to use those fifteen minutes to get them extended indefi-
nitely. Still, history cautions against putting a bet on that lame cavalry horse.
A far more constructive way to spend the allotted span of imperium might be to plan for the
time after it is inevitably over. Those fifteen minutes of disproportionate power afford a unique
"Murry and Ida Becker Professor of Law Emeritus, New York University School of Law.
'Percy Bysshe Shelley, Ozymandias.
Iraq: One Year Later 267
opportunity to influence the shape of the international system in ways that accord with the lone
superpower's cherished social, political, and legal values.
Instead, Washington seems determined to do what all other empires did: lay down the rules
by which everyone else, except it, is expected to play. This may work for a while but in the end
it will fail, leaving nothing behind but its clay feet standing sentinel in the desert.
THE UNILATERALIST TEMPTATION
Despite the warnings of history, in Washington the unilateralists are still in triumphalist
ascendance, buoyed by the illusion of easy "victories" in Afghanistan and Iraq. The carefully
crafted postwar system of multilateral diplomacy that the UN represents is being debased.
After World War II, it was the United States that was singularly responsible for designing
the post-war system of institutionalized governance and international law that is embodied in
the UN Charter. Chief of its characteristics was the strict limitation on the discretion of indi-
vidual states to resort to force.
Instead of building on that base, Washington has now boldly asserted a new policy that
openly repudiates the restrictions on recourse to force of Charter Article 2(4). When it comes
to defending our national security, President Bush again told Congress this year, "America will
never seek a permission slip to defend the security of our people."2
It is not enough to reiterate that any effort to establish a thousand-year American empire is
likely to meet the same fate as all prior essays in global grandiosity. Rather, we must under-
stand that failure represents a supremely wasted opportunity. We will always be left to wonder
what might have been, had we not squandered our brief moment at center stage.
It may be no more than human nature for the most powerful to be scofflaws. Our government
may be saying no more than did Leona Helmsley when, reputedly, she told a servant that "only
little people pay taxes."
Indeed, the United States has issued that sort of defie explicitly. The UN had emphatically
not authorized it to invade Iraq. Security Council Resolution 1441 charged Iraq with violations
of the disarmament regime imposed on it in 1991, but it addressed that failure exclusively by
deciding "to set up an enhanced inspection regime" and providing that, if compliance was not
satisfactory, the Council be convened immediately to consider the situation while warning Iraq
of"serious consequences" if there were "continued violations of its obligations." The resolution
concluded by emphasizing that the Council "will remain seized of the matter."3
How could Lord Goldsmith, the British Attorney General, conclude fiom this that, while
there is an obligation to convene the Council "to consider the matter before any action is taken
... further [military] action can be taken [by a member] without a new resolution of the
Council" and, moreover, that "all that resolution 1441 requires is reporting to and discussion
by the Security Council of Iraq's failures, but not an express further decision to authorize
force."4
The problem, then, was that the United States and Britain were unwilling to subordinate their
judgment to that of a Security Council jury.
It may be natural for a superpower to refuse to subordinate its appraisal of the facts and
conditions relevant to its national security, but such hubris may ultimately betray its national
interest. Thus, in the run-up to the Iraqi invasion it became clear that the overwhelming majori-
ty of states were of the view either that Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction or that
these could be found by augmented UN inspections. Vice President Cheney, to the contrary,
said just before the war, "There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass
2 State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), transcribed in N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2004, at Al.
UN Doc. S/Res 1441 (2002).
4 Lord Goldsmith's Statement, TIMES (LONDON), Mar. 18, 2003, at Home News 2.
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destruction" and scoffed that the UN weapons inspectors "provide no assurance whatsoever."5
He was dead wrong, and we left more than five thousand dead in the wake of that misunder-
standing.
The UN system sets up checks and balances that we destroy at our peril. As to Iraq, others
were right, we were wrong, and thousands were killed because we would not listen. Listen to
whom?
In a recent filmed interview, Robert McNamara, the Vietnam-era Secretary of Defense, dis-
cusses the nation's lack of empathy for dissenting views and sees in it a recurrent danger to the
formulation of sensible policies. "What makes us so omniscient?" he asks.
We are the strongest nation in the world today, and I do not believe that we should ever
apply that economic, political, or military power unilaterally. If we'd followed that rule in
Vietnam, we wouldn't have been there. None of our allies supported us. If we can't per-
suade nations with comparable values of the merit of our cause, we'd better re-examine our
reasoning. 6
Preening, draped in what Harold Koh calls "American exceptionalism,"7 we fell on our face
in Iraq, and the world sniggered. We have wasted the first seven of our fifteen minutes. But let
us not underestimate our capacity to learn from this catastrophic essay and to make our way
back to multilateralism.
Real realism, in place of the prevailing unilateralist fantasies, should now force a sober
reconsideration of the national advantages to be gleaned, even for the sole superpower, of a
return to the norms and institutions of multilateral diplomacy. This requires leadership, not
bullying. In the words of Harvard's Joseph Nye, "If I can get you to want to do what I want,
then I do not have to force you to do what you do not want to do."8 In its remaining eight min-
utes of imperium, instead of pursuing a policy of boastful domination and heedlessness the
United States could be nudging the world towards an effective cooperative approach to the
three predominant global problems of the century: terrorism, failed states, and poverty. But, the
only viable tactic for promoting its preferred solutions-aside from having solutions-would
be for the United States to use its influence behind the scenes to make the nations of the world
feel that it is they who are designing the common approach to these three related problems.
There is ample room for creativity and there are ideas aplenty, many of them originating with
global networks of experts and emanating from fifty years of field experience by international
organizations. Most of the components of reform are by now self-evident.
The veto needs to be rethought. First, when the Security Council has characterized a situation
as a threat or breach of the peace in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter and laid down
conditions with which the offending state must comply, that resolution should also stipulate that
any decision to use collective measures in the event of noncompliance should be made by a
majority of the Council, not subject to the veto.
Second, the world needs a standing, transnationally recruited, volunteer rapid reaction force;
its deployment must be by multilateral decision but not subject to one-state veto; it must be
under a centralized international command; its components must include police, intelligence
experts, and personnel trained in reconstructing civil societies; it must be funded by a flat
assessment against the gross national product ofevery state (or some comparable measure); and
it must be configured administratively and authorized to act in close cooperation with the
complementary capabilities of the world's major powers, with regional organizations and
5In Cheney's Words: TheAdministration Casefor Removing Saddam Hussein, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27,2002, at A8.
6 THE FOG OF WAR: ELEvEN LESSONS OF ROBERT S. MCNAMARA (Sony Pictures Classics 2003).
'Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1479 (2003).
8 JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD'S ONLY SUPERPOWER CAN'T Go IT
ALONE 9 (2002).
Iraq: One Year Later 269
groupings as well as with the world's financial, monetary, and economic development insti-
tutions.
No small task, you say? Of course not. But what's the sole superpower's exalted status for,
if not to tackle the world's really big tasks in a creative but subtle way; so that, when our fifteen
minutes are up, we will all be living, appreciatively, in a better, safer, more civilized place?
THE END OF LEGITIMACY
by Mary Ellen O'Connell*
Professor Falk tells us this is not a defining moment for international law. He believes that
because the use of force in Iraq was so blatantly unlawful nothing has been defined or redefined
as a result of it. I suggest, however, that it is a critical moment-a moment to end the erosion
in legal rules that has brought us to the point where it was not so clear to many that using force
in Iraq was blatantly unlawful.
The decision by four nations to use force in Iraq last year, with the positive support of about
two dozen more, has created a crisis for international law on the use of force. It is a crisis out
of which, however, I am confident we can forge a renewed international law. We must, as part
of the renewal, end the erosion of law caused in part by the assertion that some uses of force
are legitimate even if they are unlawful.
Last night during the presidential panel, one of the former legal advisers to the State Depart-
ment said we really do not have rules on the use of force. It was no great surprise to hear a
comment like that, but it should have been. Out of a renewal movement we should have the
goal that no one disputes the existence of real, binding international law rules on the use of
force. We should have the goal that when such a rule is violated, few remain in doubt.
An important step toward attaining widely accepted, real-law status for these rules is to reject
the approach that some uses of force are still legitimate even if they are unlawful. I am in full
agreement with Professor Franck about the danger of such thinking. It invites us to decide on
personal moral grounds rather than community-based legal grounds the acceptability of a use
of force. Instead of community-authorized decision-making bodies assessing uses of force on
the basis of existing rules, national leaders can decide on the basis of their own personal moral
views.
The abandonment of the legal approach in the Kosovo crisis created a strong precedent for
the moral approach in Iraq. The individual moral decisions of coalition leaders were viewed
by many as just as important as the views of authorized decision-makers on the Security
Council.
We need to return to legal process and legal rules on use of force. Philip Allott described to
me a few days ago what the goal should be: We international lawyers need to be able to insist
to a leader that a rule really exists, that it cannot be ignored. It may still be violated, but no one
will be confused that a real violation has occurred. In the words of James Hathaway: we will
no longer provide "camouflage for the exercise of unilateral action in defiance of legal auth-
ority."
While I am certain the "unlawful but legitimate" approach will not get us to real law, I also
wonder whether Professor Franck's approach will. In his book, Recourse to Force, he raises
some concerns for the rule of law that are posed by pronouncing actions legitimate even if
unlawful. He warns against undermining the clarity of illegality. In a case like Kosovo, he
"William B. Saxbe Designated Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law, Ohio State University. With thanks for
research assistance to Sara DePaul (J.D. 2004).
1 James Hathaway, America, Defender of Democratic Legitimacy?, 11 EUR. J. INT. L. 121, 129 (2000).
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advocates keeping the focus on the law violation but mitigating the "penalty" if circumstances
indicate.
I worry, however, that thinking in mitigation terms can also undermine substantive rules.
Mitigating a penalty before courts of law is a long way from what is possible in use-of-force
cases. Courts have a range of well-defined penalties from which to choose. A judge can shape
the penalty to meet individual circumstances and can consider the long-range impact of miti-
gating a sentence on all of society.
We have no such penalty system for violations of the international law on the use of force.
As a result, thinking about mitigating the penalty for law violation creeps into thinking about
the substantive rule. We end up at the same place as the legitimacy approach, doubting that the
substantive rule is really binding.
Yet that is what Professor Franck so very much wants to avoid. His remarks today focus on
the better approach. He advocates reaffirming real law by working to reform rules and pro-
cesses within the formal sources and methods of international law. International law is a com-
plete legal system, with means for law-making, application, and enforcement. The law provides
defenses when the strict application of the law is not warranted. It has methods for change. We
need not (and may not, in fidelity to law) rely on commentators to make exceptions for com-
plying with law based on their personal opinion.
Recent cases underscore that the international law on the use of force and the institutional
approach to applying it are basically sound. These cases underscore that the legal approach is
far more appropriate than the personal moral approach. Both the Kosovo and Iraq cases vin-
dicate Security Council and universal rules regulating the use of force. The Russians were right
in the case of Kosovo to urge the continued use of economic sanctions, human rights monitors,
and pressure on Milosevic as an alternative to seventy-plus days of high aerial bombardment.
Eleven members of the Security Council were right to want more time for UN inspectors as an
alternative to an invasion and occupation of Iraq.
The basic approach of the Security Council looks sound today and so do the bright line rules
restricting the use of significant force to self-defense in the case of an armed attack. Lesser forms
of force are permissible in the face of grave and imminent peril under the doctrine of necessity.2
States may also resort to forceful countermeasures in the face of injury.3 This is the range of
forceful legal, and therefore legitimate, action, assessed on the basis of universally agreed
principle.
The range of lawful action is practical and appropriate in today's circumstances. We need
not throw it all over and resort to personal opinion. No international lawyer should feel it is
irrational to call on governments to conform to these rules. No international lawyer should treat
this law as less than real law. Indeed, it is time for a real law movement within the interna-
tional legal system. That is what Martti Koskeniemmi's new formalism is about' and James
Hathaway's critical positivism.' They are both calling for a real law movement, a call not heard
since Kelsen was prominent but long overdue.
2 Intemational Law Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art.
25, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, at 43, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at <http://www.un.org/law/ilc>. The defense or excuse of
necessity, however, does not apply to the use of force if the force is more than de minimis. That defense did apply to
the 1967 British bombing of the Torrey Canyon on the high seas. The tanker threatened serious oil damage to the
British coast. JAMES CRAWFoRD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY:
INTRODUCTION, TEXT, AND COMMENTARIES, 181 (2002). Uses of force above the de minimis threshold must be in
self-defense or have Security Council authorization.
3 International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, arts.
22, 49-54, supra note 2.
4 Martti Koskenniemi, "The Lady Doth Protest Too Much ", Kosovo and the Turn to Ethics in International Law,
65 MOD. L. REv. 159 (2002).
'Hathaway, supra note 1, at 128.
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THE PROBLEMS OF LEGITIMACY-SPEAK
by James Crawford
This panel is not, strictly speaking, about Iraq. Rather it is about the legal, moral, and
political dialogue that the Iraq conflict has provoked among international lawyers and political
commentators (two categories of persons who may seem more and more often to intersect).
At issue is the increasing use of "legitimacy" as a guide to assessing the propriety of state
action. This did not, of course, begin with Iraq or even Kosovo. The Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary dates to the mid-nineteenth century the use of "legitimacy" in the sense of "con-
formity to law, rule, or principle; lawfulness, conformity to sound reasoning, logicality,"' and
the term has always had legal overtones. But in recent discourse there has been very little
attempt to use it in a discriminating way, despite attempts at more rigorous analysis by Franck
and others.2 Instead it has been applied as a loose substitute for "legality," a way of glossing
over difficulties presented by international action. It has given cover to the big battalions whose
conduct has appeared to be morally driven but has nonetheless not been generally approved.
Increasingly the fuzziness and indeterminacy of "legitimacy-speak" has seemed to allow us to
break free from disciplinary constraints and to assert and impose our own moral intuitions,
shared or unshared, on various target audiences.
It is revealing to ask in what contexts we would allow such uses of legitimacy arguments
within a constitutional order, e.g., within a single state governed by the rule of law. A number
of possibilities spring to mind. For example, we might praise conduct as not merely lawful but
legitimate, as when a government takes strong but nonetheless lawful action to deal with a
serious social problem. Conversely, we might accept conduct as lawful-the law allowing a
considerable margin for error or appreciation on the part of government-but nonetheless criti-
cize it as excessive or unwise. This is a perfectly proper use of language. But I doubt that we
would use the term "illegitimate" simply to indicate conduct with which we disagree. In this
sense to say that conduct is illegitimate is to make a systemic point: the law may allow you to
do that, but your conduct tends to undermine the foundations of the system as a whole.
A particular example of this use of the term arises in constitutional systems that depend sig-
nificantly on practice or convention rather than law. The British Queen might refuse her consent
to a law banning fox hunting because of a penchant for hounds-but if she did so, we might
wonder how long the requirement of royal assent would last. Such a refusal would be lawful
(the Queen has that legal power) but illegitimate.
Then there is the context in which the law is not clear, is perhaps evolving, and action is
taken that presses up against previously imagined limits. Absent a clear ruling on the point, we
might say that a use of power was legitimate, meaning that it was arguably reasonable in the
circumstances given the lack of clearer guidance. In this sense, the use of the term implies a sort
of provisional assessment. But this is a marginal usage. We would be more likely to refer to a
legitimate attempt to address the problem, or, if the action was eventually upheld, to say that
its legitimacy was vindicated.
Another possibility, of some sociological interest, could arise with respect to conduct within
a subgroup that is accepted by that subgroup even though it contravenes general societal norms
or laws. The practice of duelling in eighteenth century England may be an example; strictly, it
was homicide, but there were apparently circumstances when gentlemen did it and believed
Whewell Professor of International Law, Cambridge University.
I SHORTER OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1562 (4th ed. 1993).
2 THOMAs M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990).
272 ASIL Proceedings, 2004
correctly that they would not be punished. In such a context we could speak of a legitimate
challenge to a duel-a legitimate challenge to commit murder or manslaughter!
These examples and others do not, however, dispense with law as a basic parameter of
permissible conduct. Judgments of legitimacy are in one way or another expressed in relation
to law, not autonomously. By contrast if a lawyer were to say, within a constitutional order,
"Hereafter I dispense with considerations of law; for me all that matters is that the conduct
should seem generally appropriate and fitting, regard being had especially to motives and
eventual outcomes," we would be surprised. Would we consult such a lawyer? Would we allow
her to become or remain a judge? Fidelity to law is not (except perhaps in extremis) the same
as fidelity to one's own moral intuitions and preferences. It is in some sense external. It can be
assessed by reference to external criteria.
No doubt there may be marginal cases where individual considerations intervene. But imag-
ine a legal system, one that prohibits all forms of deliberate killing of humans, in which the
practice of euthanasia is widespread and in which the health professionals effectively exercise
the power to dispose of individuals whose life is judged not, or no longer, to be worth living.
There would be a rule-of-law problem in a society in which legitimacy and legality were in such
fundamental opposition. One would hope for a readjustment of one to the other.
Of course, it may be said that in relation to external affairs-to the province of international
law-all this is beside the point. The rule of law does not obtain in the international sphere and
attempts to introduce it are quixotic. The major powers-the United States (with steadfast sup-
port from the United Kingdom), China, even Russia-are each determined on a form of unilat-
eralism within their spheres of influence, the difference being only the scope of those spheres.
So the language of legitimacy is necessarily based on particular values and on unilateral or
partial appreciations. There are no external constraints other than those imposed by the situ-
ations in which action is to be taken, power employed, or military force used; there are certainly
no ultimate rule-governed constraints.
There are responses to such a position, but for present purposes and for the purposes of argu-
ment I propose to accept it. On this basis we are part of a "system" (a "set" would be a better
term) of states whose ignorant armies clash by night-the clashes perhaps intermittent but in
principle continuous, the ignorance extending even to the one army not knowing whether the
other has deployable weapons of mass destruction. This is not a happy situation, given the
fragility of international institutions and our massive and diverse capacity to do harm, including
perhaps ultimate harm, to life and to the planet. But if that is in truth our situation, it is as well
to know it.
Even on this hypothesis, I do not believe that lawyers should abandon the tools of their trade
and set themselves up as general philosophers or as the custodians of legitimacy. Indeed, it is
probably the case that they should be more circumspect, as lawyers, in the brave world that this
vision imagines for us. The values of consent and form that have underpinned classical inter-
national law do not seem any less useful or necessary in such a world. No doubt as citizens we
may be repelled by the spectacle of everyday military action--of targeted assassination,
reprisals, extrajudicial custody, etc. But by definition we are only citizens of specific polities;
we vote nowhere else.
Lawyering is not the same as voting. As lawyers, we probably have less right to impose our
own values, that is, values not in some way endorsed by or immanent in the law we profess,
than we would have in a more coherent system. I know good lawyering when I see it, including
good international lawyering, and I could give an account of why it is good that others
(including my opponents) could understand and even accept. I am not at all sure that I know
good legitimizing, and I am very doubtful that I could offer any such account. Moreover, so
much of legitimacy depends on the long term and comes out only in the wash. Lawyering, to
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be useful, must occur at the time of the event, or at least that is the standard form. Contingent
advice-advice contingent on outcomes-is not much use.
This is not, of course, to suggest that we turn away to some self-contained world of inter-
national law, a world by definition nonexistent. It is to suggest that we use the instruments at
our disposal, the treaty-making system, the canons of interpretation, the modalities of dispute
settlement, the hermeneutics of qualified consent, in all the particular instances that face us in
our professional lives. Of legitimacy it is for others to judge.

